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Methodological likelihoodism is the view that it is possible to provide an
adequate self-contained methodology for science on the basis of likelihood
functions alone. I argue that methodological likelihoodism is false by argu-
ing that an adequate self-contained methodology for science provides good
norms of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses, articulating minimal require-
ments for a norm of this kind, and proving that no purely likelihood-based
norm satisfies those requirements.
Introduction
One of the guiding ideas in the philosophy of induction is that “saving the
phenomena is a mark of truth” (Norton, 2005, 11). In other words, a hypothesis
is confirmed to the extent that it correctly predicts what is observed; as Milne
puts it, “prediction and confirmation are two sides of the same coin” (1996, 23).
Likelihoodism provides principles of evidential relevance and evidential fa-
voring that accord with this idea. Its primary principle of evidential favoring
is the Likelihood Principle, which says that the evidential meaning of a datum
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E for a set of hypotheses H depends only on how well each of those hypothe-
ses predicts that datum—more precisely, on the likelihood function Pr(E|H)1
considered as a function of H ∈ H, up to a constant of proportionality. Its
primary principle of evidential favoring is the Law of Likelihood, according to
which E favors H1 over H2 when and to the degree that the log-likelihood ratio
L = log[Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E|H2)] is greater than zero.2
Methodological likelihoodists such as Edwards (1972), Royall (1997), and
Sober (2008) go beyond simply accepting the Likelihood Principle and the
Law of Likelihood: they claim that it is possible to provide an adequate self-
contained3 methodology for science on the basis of likelihood functions alone.
They aim to provide a methodology that combines the main advantages of
Bayesian and frequentist methodologies without their respective disadvantages.
Like Bayesian and unlike frequentist methods, likelihoodist methods conform
to the Likelihood Principle, for which there are strong arguments (Ganden-
berger, forthcoming). Like frequentist and unlike Bayesian methods, likelihood-
ist methods avoid appeals to prior probabilities, which are often contentious.
1A more subtle account is needed when the sample space is continuous, so that Pr(E|H) = 0
for a typical datum; see (Hacking, 1965, 57, 66–70), (Berger and Wolpert, 1988, 32–6), and
(Pawitan, 2001, 23–4). In principle, this complication can be ignored in the context of any
real experiment: real measurement techniques have finite precision, so real sample spaces are
always discrete.
2The Law of Likelihood is often stated in terms of likelihood ratios rather than log-
likelihood ratios. Nothing substantive hangs on this difference. Strictly speaking, the Law of
Likelihood should be understood as the claim that evidential favoring increases monotonically
with the likelihood ratio. Different monotonic functions of the likelihood ratio produce differ-
ent permissible measurement scales. I use a logarithmic scale for ease of interpretation: zero
indicates evidential neutrality; positive values indicate that the evidence favors H1 over H2
while negative values indicate the opposite; and the degree of evidential favoring provided by
a pair of independent data is simply the sum of the degrees of evidential favoring provided by
each datum individually. The base of the logarithms is immaterial.
3The claim that this methodology is self-contained is not meant to exclude methodological
pluralism a la (Sober, 2008, 3, 356–8). Methodological likelihoodists need not believe that
methods based on likelihood functions alone are appropriate for all scientific problems. How-
ever, they must believe that they are appropriate for some scientific problems, and not merely
in the sense that they are appropriate when they would give the same answer as a reasonable
Bayesian or frequentist method or in the sense that their outputs are useful as inputs for
some other method, such as Bayesian updating. A common pluralist view that qualifies as
a form of methodological likelihoodism is that Bayesian methods are appropriate when prior
probabilities are “available” in some sense, while likelihoodist methods are appropriate when
they are not, and that they are often unavailable in science (see e.g. Sober 2008, 32).
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The purpose of this paper is to argue that methodological likelihoodism should
nevertheless be rejected.
My argument against methodological likelihoodism rests on the following
premises.
Premises
(1) An adequate self-contained methodology for science provides good norms
of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses.
(2) If there are good norms of commitment based on likelihood functions alone,
then some rule of the following form is among them, where T is your total
relevant evidence:4
ProportionRelativeAcceptance to (a Function of) theEvidence
(PRAFE): AcceptH1 overH2 to the degree f(L) = f(log[Pr(T |H1)/Pr(T |H2)]),
where f is some nondecreasing function such that f(0) = 0 and
f(a) > 0 for some a.
(3) A good norm of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses is compatible with the
following rules:
(3A) Do not prefer H1 to H2 and H3 to H4 if H1 is logically equivalent
to H4 and H2 is logically equivalent to H3 (where preferring one
hypothesis to another is equivalent to accepting the former over the
latter to a positive degree).
(3B) Accept (H1 or H2) over H3 to a degree greater than that to which
you accept H1 over H3 when the following conditions are met:
i. H1 and H2 are mutually exclusive,
4The notion of relevant evidence can be formalized in terms of sufficient statistics (see
Halmos and Savage 1949).
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ii. the degree to which you accept H1 over H3 is well-defined, and
iii. the degree to which you accept H2 over H3 is well-defined and
is not −∞.
(4) A good norm of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses is compatible with the
following rule:
(4A) Do not prefer H1 to ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 to H2 if H1 and H2 are logically
equivalent given your total evidence.
(3) and (4) each entails that no rule of the form given by (PRAFE) is a good
norm of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses. Thus, the conjunction of (1), (2),
and either (3) or (4) entails that methodological likelihoodism is false.
I argue for (1)–(4) in Sections 1–4, respectively. I prove that (3) and (4) entail
that no rule of the form given by (PRAFE) is a good norm of commitment vis-
a`-vis hypotheses in Appendices A and B, respectively. In Section 5 I respond
to attempts to defend likelihoodist methods with reliabilist arguments.
1 Premise (1): An adequate self-contained method-
ology for science provides good norms of com-
mitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses
Science should help guide our commitments vis-a`-vis hypotheses. It is not
enough to say something about how the data are related to the hypotheses;
we need to be able to “detach” the evidence and say something about the hy-
potheses themselves in light of the data. It would be odd for the author of a
scientific paper to say that he or she does not care about evaluating the hy-
potheses he or she considers, but only wishes to assess how the data bear on
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them as evidence.5
Some methodological likelihoodists, such as Edwards,6 at least suggest that
purely likelihood-based methods can be used to guide our commitments vis-
a`-vis hypotheses. Others, such as Royal and Sober, are careful not to claim
more for purely likelihood-based methods than that they correctly characterize
data as evidence (e.g. Royall 1997, 3; Sober 2008, 32). But what are we to
do with a characterization of data as evidence if not to use it to guide our
commitments? And how are we to use it to guide our commitments without
appealing to information not given by the likelihood function?
Royall and Sober provide no explicit answers to these questions. Royall
takes the value of a correct characterization of data as evidence for granted.7
Sober does not take it for granted, but he does not provide a clear argument
for it either. He says that it is not enough to show that the Law of Likelihood
“conforms to, and renders precise and systematic, our use of the informal con-
cept” of evidential favoring: “what matters,” he writes, “is whether [the Law of
Likelihood] isolates an epistemologically important concept” (Sober, 2008, 35).
I agree that it is not enough to vindicate methodological likelihoodism to show
that the Law of Likelihood captures our informal concept of evidential favoring.
But, depending on one’s views about epistemological importance, it may also
not be enough to show that the Law of Likelihood isolates an epistemologically
important concept. The Law of Likelihood could be epistemologically impor-
tant because, for instance, it is useful for explaining the so-called conjunction
5Of course, not every scientific paper should include an evaluation of the hypotheses con-
sidered therein. There may be relevant data from other sources, and the author of the paper
may wish to leave the evaluation to his or her readers. These points are compatible with my
claim that hypothesis evaluation is ultimately indispensable.
6Edwards states the Law of Likelihood in terms of support (1972, 30), but he describes it
as providing the basis for a system of inference (e.g. 1972, 7) and relative degrees of belief
(e.g. 1972, 28) without explanation or argument.
7Royall begins his (1997) with the bare assertion that the “most important task” of statis-
tics “is to provide objective quantitative alternatives to personal judgement for interpreting
the evidence produced by experiments and observational studies” (xi). I have found no argu-
ment for this claim in his writings.
5
fallacy.8 It would not follow that the Law of Likelihood provides useful guid-
ance for our commitments vis-a`-vis hypotheses, as methodological likelihoodism
requires.
Sober seems to take himself to show that the Law of Likelihood does isolate
an epistemologically important concept. However, he does not explain how he
takes himself to do so. It is a plausible guess that he takes himself to do so in his
use of the Law of Likelihood to address seemingly well-formed and important
question such as the following (Sober, 2008, 107–8):
• Are the imperfect adaptations that organisms exhibit evidence that they
were not produced by an intelligent designer?
• Is the fact that bears in cold climates have longer fur than bears in warm
climates evidence that fur length evolved by natural selection as an adap-
tive response to ambient temperature?
• Are the similarities that species exhibit evidence that they stem from a
common ancestor?
The Law of Likelihood can indeed be used to provide defensible answers to
these questions (see Gandenberger forthcoming, Gandenberger unpublished).
However, the following questions remain: what are we to do with answers to
these questions if not to use them to guide our commitments vis-a`-vis the rele-
vant hypotheses? And how are we to use them to provide such guidance without
appealing to information not given by the likelihood function?
8As an example of the conjunction fallacy, most people give a higher probability to the
statement that a character named Linda is a feminist bank teller then to the proposition that
Linda is a bank teller. Because the population of feminist bank tellers is necessarily a subset of
the population of bank tellers, these judgments are probabilistically incoherent. One possible
explanation for this phenomenon is that people are responding to the fact that the vignette
told about Linda favors the statement that she is a feminist bank teller over its negation (or
confirms it) more than it favors the statement that she is a bank teller over its negation. See
Tentori et al. (2013) for empirical evidence that seems to support this explanation.
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Methodological likelihoodists have two options: (1) claim that science need
not provide guidance for our commitments vis-a`-vis hypotheses, or (2) provide
good norms of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses that are based on likelihood
functions alone. Option (1) flies in the face of the commonsense idea that
we do science in order to learn about the world (at least in some attenuated
sense)9 or to improve our ability to predict and control some part of it. It
would be difficult to justify allocating time and tax dollars to science if all
it could do were to generate data and hypotheses and tell us how that data is
related to those hypotheses as evidence, without thereby giving us any guidance
about what to believe or do. Traditionally, philosophers of science have sought
a theory of evidence or confirmation so that they could use that theory to
evaluate hypotheses in a principled way. The idea that characterizations of
data as evidence are valuable in themselves is an unfortunate byproduct of this
pursuit.
I take up option (2) in the next section.
2 Premise (2): If there are good purely likelihood-
based norms of commitment, then (PRAFE)
is among them
I argued in the previous section that making good on methodological likelihood-
ism requires providing a good purely likelihood-based norm of commitment.
A reasonable starting point for an attempt to provide such a norm is Hume’s
dictum that a wise person proportions his or her belief to his or her (total)
evidence (1825, 111, paraphrased). We can increase the plausibility of this
9It is compatible with my claim in the section, for instance, that we do science only to
learn approximate truths about observable phenomena, as some scientific anti-realists claim
(e.g. Van Fraassen 1980).
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already plausible dictum by generalizing it in two ways. First we can replace
“belief” with “acceptance.” The word “acceptance” here could be understood
in a purely doxastic way, as indicating “what one holds in one’s head,” so
to speak. Alternatively, it could be understood in a “behavioristic” way, as
indicating something about what one would do in certain circumstances. I aim
to show that my generalization of Hume’s dictum has disastrous consequences on
either interpretation, thereby casting doubt on the possibility of a good purely
likelihood-based norm of commitment of either the doxastic or the behavioristic
kind. I assume only that degrees of acceptance correspond to a qualitative
preference ordering in the following way: accepting H1 over H2 to a positive
degree indicates that one prefers H1 to H2, doing so to degree zero indicates
that one has no preference between H1 and H2, and doing so to a negative
degree indicates that one prefers H2 to H1.
We can generalize Hume’s dictum in a second way by saying merely that a
wise person proportions his or her acceptance to some function of the evidence,
where that function satisfies the following mild constraints:
• it is nondecreasing, so that an increase in absolute value for evidential
favoring without a change in sign10 never leads to a decrease in degree of
acceptance;
• it is calibrated in the sense that neutral evidence (log[Pr(T |H1)/Pr(T |H2) =
0, i.e. Pr(T |H1) = Pr(T |H2)) leads to neutrality of acceptance (neither
preferring H1 to H2 nor vice versa);
• it is nontrivial in the sense that it would lead one to accept H1 over H2
given sufficiently strong evidence favoring the former over the latter.
10The phrase “without a change in sign” is necessary because I do not assume that the
function f is symmetric about zero. One might wish to add this assumption, but I do not need
it.
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Generalizing Hume’s dictum in these two ways leads to the following class
of purely likelihood-based norms of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses, where T
is one’s total relevant evidence.
Proportion Relative Acceptance to (a Function of) the Evidence
(PRAFE): AcceptH1 overH2 to the degree f(L) = f(log[Pr(T |H1)/Pr(T |H2)]),
where f is some nondecreasing function such that f(0) = 0 and
f(a) > 0 for some a.
I cannot think of a more plausible yet nontrivial way to map the degrees of
evidential favoring that the Law of Likelihood provides onto real-valued degrees
of relative acceptance. There are no rival proposals in the literature to consider
because methodological likelihoodists either deny that their methods provide
guidance for belief or action (e.g. Royall and Sober) or suggest that they do
provide such guidance but fail to provide a definite account (e.g. Edwards). If
methodological likelihoodists wish to claim that there are good purely likelihood-
based norms of commitment of a different form, then they need to say explicitly
what those norms are and how they are good. In the meantime, (PRAFE)’s
generality and intuitive plausibility warrant the claim that if there are good
purely likelihood-based norms of commitment, then they include some norm of
the form it provides.
Methodological likelihoodists may not be able to escape the difficulties for
(PRAFE) that I present below even if there are purely likelihood-based norms
of commitment more plausible than (PRAFE). I have argued for a particular
kind of norm only because some constraints are necessary for proving definite
results. But the problematic results for (PRAFE) that I present do not seem
to depend on any quirk of (PRAFE) that could easily be removed, but rather
from the fact that likelihood functions (unlike probability distributions) respect
neither entailment relations among hypotheses nor logical equivalence among
9
hypotheses given one’s evidence. For that reason, it seems likely that any purely
likelihood-based norm of commitment would suffer from similar problems.
3 Premise (3): A good norm of commitment is
compatible with (3A) and (3B)
I have argued that an adequate self-contained methodology for science provides
good norms of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses and that if there are any purely
likelihood-based norms of this kind then a norm of the form given by (PRAFE)
is among them. It follows that methodological likelihoodism is false if no norm
of the form given by (PRAFE) is a good one. In this section I argue that no
norm of the form given by (PRAFE) is a good one because any norm of this
kind can force one to violate either (3A) or (3B):
(3A) Do not prefer H1 to H2 and H3 to H4 if H1 is logically equivalent to H4
and H2 is logically equivalent to H3 (where preferring one hypothesis to
another means accepting the former over the latter to a positive degree).
(3B) Accept (H1 or H2) over H3 to a degree greater than that to which you
accept H1 over H3 when the following conditions are met:
i. H1 and H2 are mutually exclusive,
ii. the degree to which you accept H1 over H3 is well-defined, and
iii. the degree to which you accept H2 over H3 is well-defined and is not
−∞.
These rules are compelling. Take (3A). This rule seems innocuous in applica-
tions. For instance, it says not to prefer “all ravens are black” to “some ravens
are white” while at the same time preferring “some white things are ravens”
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to “all non-black things are non-ravens.” (Note that “some white things are
ravens” is logically equivalent to “some ravens are white” and “all non-black
things are non-ravens” is logically equivalent to “all ravens are black.”) After
all, one’s preference between a pair of propositions should not depend on the
form in which those propositions are stated.
Moreover, (3A) is completely trivial under various possible formalization
of the notion of relative acceptance. For instance, if we interpret the degree
to which one accepts A over B as one’s log-odds log[Pr(A)/Pr(B)], then (3A)
follows from the fact that probabilities do not change under substitution of
logical equivalents.11 In fact, (3A) follows from any formalization that allows
substitution of logical equivalents.
Now take (3B). Roughly speaking, this rule directs one to accept a disjunc-
tion over an alternative claim more than one accepts one of its disjuncts over
that claim, provided that one is not willing to dismiss the other disjunct com-
pletely relative to that claim. The restriction to cases in which the degree to
which one accepts H2 over H3 is not −∞ rules out cases in which one completely
rejects H2 relative to H3. Again, this rule seems innocuous in applications. For
instance, it directs one to accept “either all ravens are black or some white and
the rest of black” over “some ravens are red” to a degree greater than that to
which one accepts “all ravens are black” over “some ravens are red,” provided
that the degree to which one accepts “all ravens are black” over “some ravens
are red” is well-defined and the degree to which one accepts “some ravens are
white and the rest are black” over “some ravens are red” is well-defined and
11It is arguably permissible in some sense for subjective degrees of belief to vary under
substitution of logical equivalents. For instance, one would hardly blame a person of average
mathematical ability who was attempting to assess the size of a cubic box for assigning
different probabilities to the proposition that each side of the box is 27 inches long and the
proposition that the box has volume 19, 683 in.3 (Rescorla, unpublished, 18–9), even though
those hypotheses are equivalent. But this case does involve a failure to be fully rational; it
is just a failure of logical omniscience rather than a failure of probability assessment. Thus,
though excusable, it is not rationally permissible in any strong sense.
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is not −∞. This application of (3B0 seems obligatory. After all, “either all
ravens are black or some are white and the rest are black” encompasses more
possibilities than “all ravens are black,” so it makes sense to accept the former
over some third claim to a greater degree than letter, provided that one gives
any credence at all to the additional possibilities it encompasses.
Like (3A), (3B) would hold under a variety of possible formalizations of the
notion of relative acceptance. For instance, if we again interpret the degree to
which one accepts A over B as one’s log- odds log[Pr(A)/Pr(B)], then (3B) fol-
lows from the axioms of probability. Probabilities obey finite additivity, meaning
that Pr(H1 or H2) = Pr(H1) + Pr(H2) when H1 and H2 are mutually exclu-
sive. It follows that log[Pr(H1 or H2)/Pr(H3)] > log[Pr(H1)/Pr(H3)] when
Pr(H2)/Pr(H3) > 0 and H1 and H2 are mutually exclusive. An analogous ar-
gument would work under any analogous interpretation that uses an additive
(or superadditive)12 calculus.
It is possible to give a very simple argument that (PRAFE) forces one to
violate (3B) without assuming (3A). However, this argument makes an objec-
tionable assumption. Suppose you were to run a completely uninformative ex-
periment: you have me flip a coin with unknown bias p for heads but to report
“heads” regardless of how it lands. Then Pr(E|p = p∗) = 1 for all 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ 1.
The Law of Likelihood entails that that outcome is neutral between any pair of
H1 : 0 ≤ p < 1/3, H2 : 1/3 ≤ p < 2/3, and H3 : 2/3 ≤ p < 1. But it also implies
that it is neutral between (H1 or H2) and H3. This combination of claims is not
problematic as long as we are only talking about evidential favoring. But us-
ing (PRAFE) to translate talk about evidential favoring into talk of acceptance
yields violations of (3B).
12A superadditive calculus f such as the Dempster-Shafer calculus (Dempster, 1968)) is
one whose axioms guarantee only that f(H1 or H2) ≥ f(H1) + f(H2) when H1 and H2 are
mutually exclusive.
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If you find this argument against (PRAFE) convincing, then so much the
better for my thesis. I do not place much weight on it because it has a weak
point. One could claim that the size of the interval for p that a hypothesis posits
is relevant to its assessment, either as part of the total relevant evidence with
respect to that hypothesis or as a factor apart from the evidence that should
play some role in a rule such as (PRAFE) for translating degrees of favoring
into degrees of acceptance. I suspect that this claim is unsustainable, but I
would rather make it moot than argue against it. I do so by providing a more
elaborate argument in which I apply (PRAFE) only to intervals of equal sizes in
two different parameterizations of the hypothesis space and use (3B) to generate
a violation of (3A).
That argument is given in Appendix A. Here is roughly how it goes. I con-
struct a hypothetical experiment the outcome of which is evidentially neutral
between hypotheses A, B, and C according to the Law of Likelihood. By stipu-
lation, that outcome is one’s only evidence about those hypotheses. (PRAFE)
thus requires you to be neutral between hypotheses A, B, and C. (3B) thus
requires you to prefer (A or B) over C. I then consider an alternative set of
hypotheses A′, B′, and C ′ between which the outcome is also evidentially neu-
tral according to the Law of Likelihood. By an analogous argument, (PRAFE)
and (3B) require you to prefer (A′ or B′) over C ′. It thereby requires you to
violate (3A). For the hypotheses are constructed so that (A or B) is logically
equivalent to C ′ and (A′ or B′) is logically equivalent to C. Thus, (PRAFE)
forces you to violate either (3A) or (3B).
Because (PRAFE) can force13 you to violate either (3A) or (3B), the fact that
(3A) and (3B) are compelling warrants the claim that (PRAFE) is not a good
norm of commitment vis-a`-vis hypotheses. It follows from this claim together
13“(PRAFE) can force you to violate...” should be understood as shorthand for “any norm
of the form given by (PRAFE) can force you to violate...”
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with the claims I argued for in the previous two sections that methodological
likelihood is false.
4 Premise (4): A good norm of commitment is
compatible with (4A)
In this section I argue that (PRAFE) is not a good norm of commitment for a
second reason: it can force one to violate (4A):
(4A) Do not prefer H1 to ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 to H2 if H1 and H2 are
logically equivalent given your total evidence.
(4A) is compelling. It is similar to (3A) in that it requires degrees of ac-
ceptance to respect a certain kind of logical equivalence. Is stronger than (3A)
in that requires only logical equivalence given one’s evidence. It is weaker than
(3A) in that it has implications only for preferences between hypotheses and
their negations.
Like (3A) and (3B), (4A) seems innocuous in applications. It prohibits
someone who knows that no ravens are red from preferring “all ravens are either
black or red” to its negation while dispreferring “all ravens are black” to its
negation. For someone who knows that no ravens are red, these hypotheses
have the same content and thus should be assessed alike.
Like (3A), (4A) is completely trivial under any formalization of relative
acceptance that allows substitution of logical equivalents.
I prove that (PRAFE) can force one to violate (4A) in Appendix B. Here
is roughly how the proof goes. Let H1 be the conjunction of some proposition
A with E, and let H2 be just the proposition A. Suppose that E is one’s
total relevant evidence. I show that for any constant a, one can construct a
probability distribution over A and E such that the log-likelihood ratios of H1
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against ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 against H2 both exceed a. Thus, given any norm of the
form given by (PRAFE) there is a possible experimental outcome that would
lead one to prefer H1 over ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 over H2. In this way, (PRAFE) can
force you to violate (4A).
Because (PRAFE) can force you to violate (4A), the fact that (4A) is com-
pelling warrants the claim that (PRAFE) is not a good norm of commitment
vis-a`-vis hypotheses. It follows from this claim together with the claims I argued
for in Sections 1 and 2 that methodological likelihoodism is false.
It is worth noting that one could avoid violating (4A) by adopting a restricted
version of (PRAFE) that applies only to statistical hypotheses—that is, hy-
potheses that are simply about the stochastic properties of the data-generating
mechanism. H1 in my proof—the conjunction of some proposition A with E
itself—is not a statistical hypothesis because it makes a direct statement about
the outcome produced by the data-generating mechanism. Some likelihoodists
do restrict the Law of Likelihood in this way (e.g. Hacking 1965, 59 and Ed-
wards 1972, 57). However, they seem to do so not for any principled reason
but simply because they have statistical applications in mind. It is not clear
that the restriction has any principled basis. Moreover, it has the unfortunate
consequence of restricting the scope of the Law of Likelihood substantially. For
instance, it would not allow one to apply the Law of Likelihood to high-level,
substantive scientific theories, as Sober does with the theory of evolution and
the theory of intelligent design (Sober, 2008). In addition, it does not address
the fact that (PRAFE) can force one to violate either (3A) or (3B). Thus, re-
stricting the Law of Likelihood to statistical hypotheses has a high cost and
is insufficient to avoid the major difficulties for methodological likelihoodism
presented in this paper.
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5 Against a reliabilist response
The fact that (PRAFE) can force one to violate either (3A) or (3B) and (4A)
disqualifies it from consideration as a general principle of rationality. One might
attempt to rescue methodological likelihoodism by lowering one’s standards.
Perhaps no purely likelihood-based norms of commitment are among the canons
of rationality, but such norms are nevertheless useful in practice when deployed
judiciously. This move may not appeal to most philosophers, but similar moves
are common among statisticians (e.g. Chatfield 2002, Kass 2011, and Gelman
2011).
The idea that (PRAFE) is useful when deployed judiciously is plausible only
if it has some redeeming quality that at least partially compensates for the fact
that it is inconsistent with the conjunction of (3A) and (3B) and with (4A).
What could that redeeming quality be? Here are four candidates from Royall
(2000, 760):
(I) intuitive plausibility,
(II) consistency with other axioms and principles,
(III) objectivity, and
(IV) desirable operational implications.
I am willing to grant (I)-(III) for the sake of argument. Those virtues are not
sufficient, even jointly, to vindicate methodological likelihoodism. It still needs
to be shown that methods based on likelihood functions alone can provide useful
guidance for our commitments vis-a`-vis hypotheses.
(IV) is prima facie more promising. It refers to the purported fact that purely
likelihood-based methods are guaranteed to perform well in certain senses in
the indefinite long run if used over and over again with varying data. Appeals
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to guarantees about long-run performance are the hallmark of frequentism, but
Bayesians cite such results as well, perhaps most often in the form of convergence
theorems (e.g. Doob 1949). The exact significance of various facts about long-
run operating characteristics is a matter of dispute, but there is no disputing
the basic idea that we want techniques that we can reasonably expect to yield
good results.
Unfortunately for this line of response, likelihoodist appeals to (IV) generate
many problems. The most damning of these problems is that the operating
characteristics that likelihoodists appeal to are not operating characteristics of
purely likelihood-based methods. Instead, they are operating characteristics of
methods that use likelihood functions in a frequentist way.
Let me explain. By definition, purely likelihood-based methods are not
sensitive to differences between experimental outcomes that are not reflected
in the likelihood function. One such fact concerns the distinction between fixed
and random hypotheses. Fixed hypotheses are specified without reference to the
data, while random hypotheses are specified in terms of the data. For instance,
the hypothesis that the mean of the distribution that produced the data is zero
is a fixed hypothesis, while the hypothesis that it is the sample average (the sum
of the data values divided by the number of data values) is a random hypothesis,
because the value of the sample average depends on the data while the value of
the number zero does not.
By contrast, frequentist methods violate the likelihood principle by being
sensitive to the distinction between fixed and random hypotheses. A frequentist
may draw different conclusions about the hypothesis that the mean of a distri-
bution is zero depending on whether he or she set out to test the hypothesis
that the mean is zero or set out to test the hypothesis that the mean is the
sample average, which turned out to be zero.
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Whether sensitivity to the distinction during fixed and random hypothe-
ses is a good feature for a method to have or not is a topic for another oc-
casion. The key points for present purposes are (1) such sensitivity cannot
be present inpurely likelihood-based methods, and (2) it is necessary for the
long-run operating characteristics that likelihoodists erroneously cite in sup-
port of their methods. I will illustrate these claims for the universal bound,
which is the fact that the probability of a likelihood ratio of at least k for
any given fixed, false hypothesis against the true hypothesis is at most 1/k
(i.e., PrH0(Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E|H0) ≥ k) < 1/k) (Royall, 2000, 762-3). The same
point holds for other results can concerning the performance characteristics of
methods based on likelihood functions, including both the tighter bounds that
Royall derives for specific distributions (2000) and likelihood ratio convergence
theorems (Hawthorne, 2012).
An example14 due to (Armitage, 1961) is a counterexample to a generalized
version of the universal bound that applies to fixed as well as random hypotheses.
I will simply describe the main features of the Armitage example here; see (Cox
and Hinkley, 1974, 50–1) for details. The example involves taking observations
until the sample average x¯ is at least a specified distance away from zero. That
distance decreases as the number of observations increases. It does so at a rate
that is fast enough that the experiment is guaranteed to end in finite time,15
but slow enough to ensure that according to the Law of Likelihood its final
outcome strongly favors the hypothesis that the true mean equals x-bar over the
hypothesis that it equals zero. For any k, there is an experiment of this kind such
that PrH0(Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E|H0) ≥ k) is 1—a maximally severe violation of the
universal bound. I have argued elsewhere (Gandenberger, unpublished) that this
example should not be regarded as a counterexample to the Law of Likelihood
14Strictly speaking, Armitage provides a class of examples rather than a single example. I
am using the word “example” as a convenient shorthand.
15Technically, the experiment ends “almost surely” (i.e., with probability one) in finite time.
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itself. However, it is a counterexample to attempts to use the universal bound
to support the use of purely likelihood-based methods.
Likelihood functions do not distinguish between fixed and random hypothe-
ses, so purely likelihood-based methods cannot distinguish between them either.
Thus, results such as the universal bound that hold only for fixed hypotheses do
not support the use of purely likelihood-based methods. Methodological like-
lihoodists who wish to claim that purely likelihood-based methods are useful
when deployed judiciously need to find some other support for that view.
6 Conclusion
Methodological likelihoodism is true only if (PRAFE) is a good purely likelihood-
based norm of commitment. (PRAFE) is not a good purely likelihood-based
norm of commitment because it can force one to violate both the combination
of (3A) and (3B) and (4A). Therefore, methodological likelihoodism is false.
The results concerning long-run operating characteristics that methodological
likelihoodists sometimes cite in support of their methods do not help their cause
because those results concern frequentist methods that use likelihood functions
rather than purely likelihood-based methods.
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A Proof that (PRAFE) can force one to violate
either (3A) or (3B)
Proof
Suppose a mad genius has mixed water and wine in a bottle. You know only
that the ratio r of water to wine is in the interval (1/2, 2]. The mad genius
knows the value of r but refuses to tell it to you. He does agree to perform
three independent rolls of a three-sided die with weights that depend on r as
shown in the following table (ignore the final column for the moment).








If r′ is in the
interval...
(1/2, 1] 1/2 1/3 1/6 [1, 2)
(1, 3/2] 1/6 1/2 1/3 (2/3, 1]
(3/2, 2] 1/3 1/6 1/2 (1/2, 2/3]
For instance, if r is in the interval (1/2, 1], then the mad genius will report
the results of three rolls of a three-sided die such that the probability of 1 is
1/2, the probability of 2 is 1/3, and the probability of 3 is 1/6.
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Suppose the mad genius reports the outcomes 1, 2, and 3. This outcome
has the same probability (1/2)(1/3)(1/6) = 1/36 under each of the hypotheses
H1 : 1/2 < r ≤ 1, H2 : 1 < r ≤ 3/2, and H3 : 3/2 < r ≤ 2. It is your total
relevant evidence, so (PRAFE) says to accept each of those hypotheses over
each of the others to degree zero (i.e., to be neutral among them). Thus, (3B)
says to prefer (H2 or H3) : 1 < r ≤ 2 to H1 : 1/2 < r ≤ 1 to a degree greater
than zero.
Now consider the ratio r′ of wine to water instead of the ratio r of water
to wine. Before the die roll, you have no information about r′ except that it
is in the interval [1/2, 2). The table above gives the probability distributions
for the die roll outcomes under each possible value of r′. The outcome {1, 2, 3}
has the same probability (1/2)(1/3)(1/6) = 1/36 under each of the hypotheses
H ′1 : 1/2 ≤ r′ < 2/3, H ′2 : 2/3 ≤ r′ < 1, and H ′3 : 1 ≤ r′ < 2. Moreover,
it has the same probability under each of the hypotheses H∗1 : 1/2 ≤ r′ < 1,
H∗2 : 1 ≤ r′ < 3/2, and H∗3 : 3/2 ≤ r′ < 2. For if H∗1 : 1/2 ≤ r′ < 1 is
true, then either 1/2 ≤ r′ < 2/3 or 2/3 ≤ r′ < 1. Either way, the probably
of the outcome is 1/36. Thus, if H∗1 is true, then the probably the outcome
is 1/36. If H∗2 : 1 ≤ r′ < 3/2 is true, then 1 ≤ r′ < 2, so the probably the
outcome is 1/36. Likewise for H∗3 . The die roll is your total relevant evidence,
so (PRAFE) says to accept each of the hypotheses H∗1 , H
∗
2 , and H
∗
3 over each
of the others to degree zero (i.e., to be neutral among them). Thus, (3B) says
to prefer (H∗2 or H
∗
3 ) to H
∗
1 to a degree greater than zero.
But now we have violated (3A). (H2 or H3) : 1 < r ≤ 2 is equivalent to H∗1 :
1/2 ≤ r′ < 1, and H1 : 1/2 < r ≤ 1 is equivalent to (H∗2 or H∗3 ) : 1 ≤ r′ < 2.




3 ) over H
∗
1 . Therefore,
(PRAFE) can force you to violate either (3A) or (3B).
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Discussion
Two objections to this proof are worth discussing. First, statisticians distinguish
between “simple” and “complex” statistical hypotheses. A simple statistical
hypothesis says that the data- generating mechanism follows a particular prob-
ability distribution. A complex statistical hypothesis is a disjunction of simple
statistical hypotheses. The Law of Likelihood applies in the first instance only
to simple statistical hypotheses. It might seem that the hypotheses we consider
here are complex statistical hypotheses. After all, they are disjunctions of more
specific hypotheses about the value of r. One could claim that for this reason
(PRAFE), properly understood, does not apply to those hypotheses.
That response to the example will not work. The hypotheses we have con-
sidered are disjunctions of hypotheses that posit particular values for r. But






2 , and H
∗
3 are not disjunctions of hypotheses that
posit different probability distributions for the outcome of the die roll. They
are instead disjunctions of hypotheses that all imply the same probability dis-
tribution for the outcome of the die roll. A likelihoodist who denied that we can
say Pr(A|H) = a because Pr(A|Hi) = a for all Hi in some partition of H would
be in deep trouble. It is this assumption that allows us to ignore irrelevant
partitions of our hypotheses, which can always (or at least virtually always) be
found. (For instance, we routinely ignore the fact that the hypothesis H that a
given coin is fair can be partitioned into the hypothesis H1 that the coin is fair
and the moon is made of green cheese and the hypothesis H2 that the coin is
fair and the moon is not made of green cheese. In the same way, we can ignore
the fact that the hypothesis 1/2 < r ≤ 1, for instance, can be partitioned into
hypotheses of the form r = 1/2 +  for 0 <  ≤ 1/2.)
Now, H∗1 is a disjunction of hypotheses not all which posit the same probabil-
ity distribution for the outcome of the die roll. But we can arrive at a likelihood
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for H∗1 on {1, 2, 3} in several ways. One way, used in the proof, is to interpret
likelihoods as probabilities entailed by hypotheses and to use disjunction elimi-
nation to derive that H∗3 entails Pr({1, 2, 3}) = 1/36. But Bayesians and some
likelihoodists want to interpret likelihoods as conditional probabilities.
There are at least two ways to get a likelihood for H∗1 under this inter-
pretation. One way is to invoke a version of the law of total probability: if
B = (B1 or B2), then Pr(A|B) = Pr(A|B1) Pr(B1|B) + Pr(A|B2) Pr(B2|B).
Thus,
Pr({1, 2, 3}|H∗1 ) = Pr({1, 2, 3}|H ′1) Pr(H ′1|H∗1 ) + Pr({1, 2, 3}|H ′2) Pr(H ′2|H∗1 )
= 1/36 Pr(H ′1|H∗1 ) + 1/36 Pr(H ′2|H∗1 )
= 1/36[Pr(H ′1|H∗1 ) + Pr(H ′2|H∗1 )]
= 1/36 Pr(H ′1 or H
′
2|H∗1 )
= 1/36 Pr(H∗1 |H∗1 )
= 1/36
Now, some likelihoodists would reject this argument. The result does not
depend on the values of Pr(H ′1|H∗1 ) and Pr(H ′2|H∗1 ), but the argument does
mention those values and thus assumes that they exist. Some likelihoodists
would reject that assumption.
For a likelihoodist who interprets likelihoods as conditional probabilities and
rejects the existence of probabilities that are not objectively well-defined, there
is still another way to get a likelihood for H∗1 : invoke the Principal Principle.
The Principal Principle (Lewis, 1981) says that one’s credence for A given a
proposition which entails that the chance of A is x and no inadmissible infor-
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mation16 should be x: Cr(A|H) = x where H entails Ch(A) = x and contains
no inadmissible information. If we interpret Pr({1, 2, 3}|H∗1 ) as a credence,
then it follows that Pr({1, 2, 3}|H∗1 ) = Pr({1, 2, 3}|H ′1 or H ′2) = 1/36, because
(H ′1 or H
′
2) entails Ch({1, 2, 3}) = 1/36 by a disjunction elimination. If we in-
terpret Pr({1, 2, 3}|H∗1 ) as a chance rather than a credence, then we do not need
the Principal Principle but only the transparently obvious chance-chance prin-
ciple which says that Ch(A|H) = x where H entails Ch(A) = x and contains
no inadmissible information.
Second, one could claim that the outcomes of the die rolls are not part of
one’s total relevant evidence with respect to the hypotheses under consideration.
One’s total relevant evidence with respect to those hypotheses is the empty
set. After all, one’s assessment of those hypotheses makes no difference to
one’s assessment of the probability of that outcome. This claim is somewhat
reasonable, but it does not help. We could simply ask what the probability is of
one’s total relevant evidence with respect to the hypotheses under consideration
in the empty set is under each of those hypotheses. For each hypothesis, that
probability is simply the probability that the outcome of the die roll is 1, putting
us back where we started.
Now, a natural response to this maneuver is to claim that (PRAFE) applies
only to non-empty bodies of relevant evidence (or to non-neutral bodies of ev-
idence if evidence can be both relevant and neutral). One could, for instance,
adapt the approach to ignorance that Norton (2008) develops by assigning the
same non-numerical degree of relative acceptance I to all pairs of contingent
hypotheses in cases of neutral evidence. However, this response faces at least
two difficulties. First, it creates unnatural discontinuities. On this proposal,
we are not required to formulate any commitments about the hypotheses H1,
16See (Lewis, 1981) for a discussion of admissibility. Roughly speaking, information is
in admissible if it speaks to the outcome of a chance process rather than to its stochastic
properties.
26
H2, and H3 in light of the evidence in the example as it stands—not even a
commitment of neutrality. But suppose we modified the example slightly by
adding some tiny quantity  to the probability of 1 under each possible value
of r and subtracting it from the probability of 3 under each possible value of r.
Then we would be required to formulate commitments, namely minute prefer-
ences for H2 over H1 and over H3. The idea that neutral evidence requires no
commitments while arbitrarily slightly non-neutral evidence requires completely
definite commitments is hard to accept.
Second, this response sets up a game of cat-and-mouse that seems unlikely to
end well for the methodological likelihoodist. An example involving exactly neu-
tral evidence is needed to illustrate a conflict among (PRAFE), (3A), and (3B)
only because I made those principles very weak so that they would command
nearly universal assent. Similar but slightly stronger principles would conflict
in cases of non-neutral evidence. For instance, (3B) says to accept (H1 or H2)
over H3 to a degree greater than that to which you accept H1 over H3 under
the relevant conditions. Presumably, in each case in which (3B) applies, there is
some definite amount by which the former should exceed the latter. In the case
at hand, for instance, there is some positive number t such that it is at least
permissible to accept (H2 or H3) over H1 to degree t. One could use this mar-
gin t to generate the same kind of argument in a similar case with sufficiently
slightly non-neutral evidence.
B Proof that (PRAFE) can force one to violate
(4A)
(4A) Do not prefer H1 to ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 to H2 if H1 and H2 are logically
equivalent given your total evidence.
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Proof
Let X1 and X2 record the outcomes of independent coin flips. If the first coin
lands heads, then X1 = 1. Otherwise X1 = 0. Likewise, if the first coin lands
heads, then X2 = 1. Otherwise X2 = 0. Let E be the evidence X1 = 1, H1 the
hypothesis X1 = X2 = 1, and H2 the hypothesis X2 = 1. Suppose that E is
the only information one has about X1 and X2.
Fix the function f such that (PRAFE) says to accept H1 over H2 to degree
f(L) = f(Pr(T |H1)/Pr(T |H2)). By the formulation of (PRAFE), there’s some
constant a such that f(a) > 0 (and thus f(x) > 0 for all x > a, since f is
nondecreasing). I will show in a moment the following:
(*) For any a, there is a joint distribution for X1 and X2 such that
Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E| ∼ H1) > a and Pr(E| ∼ H2)/Pr(E|H2) > a.
Thus, (PRAFE) forces one to prefer H1 to ∼ H1 and ∼ H2 to H2. But given
E, H1 and H2 are equivalent. Therefore, (PRAFE) forces one to violate (4A).
I will now prove (*) by showing how to construct for any a a joint distribution
over X1 and X2 such that such that Pr(E|H1)/Pr(E| ∼ H1) > a and Pr(E| ∼
H2)/Pr(E|H2) > a. Let a be some value greater than 1/2 of x such that
f(a) > 0 for all x > a. Choose a b > (2a−1)/(2a+1). Then assign probabilities














Here is a derivation of the relevant likelihood ratios.
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Pr(E|H1)




Pr(E & ∼ H1)
=
Pr(X1 = X2 = 1)
Pr(X1 = X2 = 1)
Pr(∼ (X1 = X2 = 1))
Pr(X1 = 1 & X2 = 0)
=
1− Pr(X1 = X2 = 1)






1− b − 2
=





This quantity is monotonically increasing in b. Thus, it follows that if b >
(2a− 1)/(2a+ 1),17 then
Pr(E|H1) Pr(E| ∼ H1) > 21 + (2a− 1)/(2a+ 1)
1− (2a− 1)/(2a+ 1)
= 2
2a+ 1 + 2a− 1






And now the other likelihood ratio.
17b > (2a−1)/(2a+1) is always permissible, because a > 1/2 implies 0 < (2a−1)/(2a+1) <










Pr(X1 = 1 & X2 = 0)
Pr(X2 = 0)
Pr(X2 = 1)









This quantity is monotonically increasing in b. Thus, it follows that if b >
(2a− 1)/(2a+ 1), then
Pr(E| ∼ H2)
Pr(E|H2) > 1/2
1 + (2a− 1)/(2a+ 1)
1− (2a− 1)/(2a+ 1)
= 1/2
2a+ 1 + 2a− 1






Note that restricting (PRAFE) so that it applies only to mutually exclusive hy-
potheses does not block this proof. (PRAFE) is applied only to the comparison
between H1 and ∼ H1 and the comparison between H2 and ∼ H2. Those pairs
of hypotheses are of course mutually exclusive. H1 and H2 are not mutually
exclusive, but (PRAFE) is not applied to the comparison between H1 and H2
directly.
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